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IS INTERNATIONAL GROWTH 
THE WAY OUT OF U.S.CURRENT
ACCOUNT DEFICITS? 
A NOTE OF CAUTION
ANWAR M. SHAIKH, GENNARO ZEZZA, AND CLAUDIO H. DOS SANTOS 
The current account deficit of the United States has been growing steadily as a 
share of GDP for more than a decade. It is now at an all-time high, over 5 percent 
of GDP (see Figure 1). This steady deterioration has been greeted with an increasing
amount of concern (U.S Trade Deficit Review Commission 2000; Brookings Papers
2001; Godley 2001; Mann 2002). At The Levy Economics Institute, we have long
argued that this burgeoning deficit is unsustainable. A current account deficit
implies a growing external debt, which in turn implies a continuing shift in 
net income received from abroad (net interest and dividend flows) in favor of
foreigners. We have also noted that with the private sector headed toward balance,
a growing current account deficit implies a corresponding growing “twin”deficit 
for the government sector (Papadimitriou, et al 2002; Godley 2003). This 
latter scenario has already come to pass: the latest figures show that the general 
government deficit rose to an annual rate of more than 4 percent of GDP in the 
first quarter of 2003 and will certainly rise even more in the near future, since the
federal deficit alone is officially projected to reach 4 percent by the end of
this fiscal year (CBO 2003).
Senior Scholar ANWAR M. SHAIKH is professor in the department of economics, graduate faculty of political and social science, New School
University. Research Scholar GENNARO ZEZZA is professor at the University of Cassino, Italy. Shaikh, Zezza, and Research Scholar CLAUDIO
H. DOS SANTOS are members of the Levy Institute macro-modeling team.THE PRINCIPAL FORCE behind the deterioration of the cur-
rent account deficit is the balance of trade, as is evident in
Figure 1. Identifying the determinants of the balance of trade
is therefore crucial to any effort at understanding the trends
of the current account.
In  analyzing the trade balance, economists customarily
explain imports by their prices relative to those of domestic
goods, and by domestic income; and exports by their relative
price in foreign countries, and by foreign income. In either
case,a rise in the income of the country purchasing the goods
tends to increase the quantity of the goods demanded, while
a rise in the relative price of goods tends to decrease their
quantity demanded,other things being equal.For this reason,
when a country grows faster than its trading partners, its
imports tend to expand more rapidly than its exports, and its
trade balance deteriorates. The same thing happens when its
real exchange rate appreciates (i.e., when its domestic price
level in foreign currency rises relative to the price level of its
trading partners), because this tends to make the relative
price of its exports rise and that of its imports fall.
For the purposes of The Levy Economics Institute’s macro-
economic model, it is necessary to have quarterly data on all
of these variables, in sufficient detail to be able to construct
useful sectoral aggregates. At any particular level of aggrega-
tion, the requirements are that any measure of foreign
income should provide good estimates of the impact on U.S.
exports of changes in foreign incomes and in relative export
prices, based on parameters that are sufficiently stable to be
useful for medium-term projections.
And therein lies the difficulty: for while good quarterly data is
widely available for U.S. income and prices, similar quarterly
data for U.S.trading partners is much harder to come by.With
respect to income measures, some authors, such as Mann
(2002, 137–38), have therefore relied on annual measures of
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(i.e., all countries except the United States).
Others,such as Marquez and Ericsson (1993),construct annual measures of the aggregate real
GDP of a small number of certain “important” and/or “representative” U.S. trade partners.
Most recently, Chinn (2003, pp. 6, 33) has managed to avail himself of quarterly estimates of
an export-weighted measure of the aggregate real GDP of “major” trading partners, albeit
from unpublished sources.
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The trouble is that rest-of-the-world measures are likely to be too broad, since they encom-
pass many countries whose trade with the United States is negligible. On the other hand,
“major” trading-partner measures may be too narrow, since they leave out some rapidly
growing trading partners (see the next section).
Ideally, one would like to have quarterly measures encompassing a large sample of U.S. trad-
ing partners. Such measures might be direct (unweighted) sums or export-weighted ones,
and they might be at different levels of aggregation. In the Levy Institute macro model, we
previously utilized an aggregate quarterly measure of U.S. trading-partner real GDP. This
measure was initially developed in the late 1970s and successively extended since then.
3
But
the quality and coverage of available data has greatly improved since the initial construction
of this measure, and many underlying variables have been substantially revised even for 
earlier years.
In this policy note,we report on the construction of a quarterly database for U.S.trading part-
ners, using the most recently available data. This allows us to develop several new measures,
some of which we discuss here. In particular, we first present our new quarterly measures of
U.S.trading-partner real GDP.The trading partners in question account for 90 percent of U.S.
exports, and we construct both direct and export-weighted sums of their real GDPs. In addi-
tion, we look at various subsets of these, including what the Federal Reserve calls “major-
currency” and “other important” trading partners. The Federal Reserve constructs separate
effective exchange rates for these latter two groups, and we will see that they generally behave
quite differently along a variety of dimensions.
In what follows, we first outline our sources and methods and then present the data. Further
details, along with access to the data itself, are available in Levy Economics Institute Working
Paper no. 387.
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3Constructing Measures of U.S. Trading-Partner GDP
Our point of departure is the Federal Reserve trade-weighted “Broad Index of the Foreign
Exchange Value of the Dollar,”
4
which is built around the 36 trading partners
5
of the United
States that account for close to 90 percent of its foreign trade.
6
The Federal Reserve also
groups them into two sets that might be called “major-currency trading partners”and “other
important trading partners,” for which it provides the following two sub-indexes of its
“broad”exchange rate index:
Major-Currency Trading Partners 
Australia, Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
Other Important Trading Partners
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia,
Mexico, Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Venezuela
The basic quarterly data for the individual countries were derived from the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) database on “International Financial Statistics” (IFS), available on
CD-ROM. The real GDPs of individual countries were all put in the same units (billions of
national currency), seasonally adjusted, and annualized (so that the quarterly measures rep-
resent the annual equivalent), based in 1995 constant prices, and converted to 1995 U.S. con-
stant-dollars using country-specific (market or official) exchange rates for that particular
year. Many series were incomplete, and these had to be modified and/or complemented in
various manners using a variety of sources. Our complete data set then encompassed consis-
tent real GDP figures for each of the 36 countries,
7
from the first quarter of 1970 to the last
quarter of 2002.
8
This data set has many possible uses.Here,we present data on two basic aggregates (the direct
and export-share-weighted sums of these real GDPs),
9
and on various subdivisions of these
aggregates, including the two identified as “major” and “other important” trading partners,
for which the Federal Reserve provides effective exchange rates. In the case of export-
weighted measures, we created various fixed-weight indexes, using export shares from 1971,
1981, 1991, and 2001, respectively. We also created variable-weight measures using annual
export shares.Lastly,we created a measure using periodically adjusted fixed weights,by splic-
ing the various fixed-weight series together in each relevant year (e.g.,splicing the 1981 series
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4to the 1971 series in the year 1981, etc.). It is this latter meas-
ure we present here, since it represents a balance between the
other two types. The single year fixed-weight measures fail to
take changing trade patterns into account. On the other
hand, in the case of the variable-weight measures, the fluctu-
ations in quarterly export shares used as weights add unnec-
essary volatility to the overall series.
U.S. Exports and Trading-Partner Real GDP
Figure 2 depicts quarterly U.S.real GDP and two new aggregate
measures of the real GDP of U.S. trading partners, expressed 
as the logs of the actual values.
10
As it turns out, the direct sum
of U.S. trading partners together represents a “region” whose
real GDP is roughly two and a half times as large as that of
the United States. The weighted sum, on the other hand, is
higher, because many of the richest trading partners have
high weights.
11
Figure 3 depicts the trading-partner GDPs,rel-
ative to that of the United States. We can see that both meas-
ures rise relative to U.S. GDP from 1970–82, stagnate from
1982–91, and fall after 1992. This last pattern has been widely
cited as an important factor in the steady deterioration of the
U.S. trade balance since 1992 (Council of Economic Advisers
2003, 62; Mann 2002, 137–38).
Our measures can also be compared to others used in simi-
lar investigations, such as the “rest-of-the-world” (ROW)
real GDP calculated from annual World Bank data (the 
latter being available only up to 2000).
12
Figure 4 displays
the ratios of our two measures (converted to annual obser-
vations) to that of the ROW real GDP. Not surprisingly,
our direct sum is very similar to the ROW measure,
13
since 
the latter is itself simply a broader direct sum.But our meas-
ure has two advantages: it is quarterly, and it is consistent
with the Federal Reserve exchange rate index and its sub-
divisions.
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Figure 3  U.S.Trading-Partner Real GDPs 
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Sources: BEA and authors’ calculationsMore striking is the fact that the export-weighted GDP meas-
ure rose steadily relative to the ROW one. This implies that,
in comparison to the direct sum and ROW measures, the
export-weighted measure would tend to yield lower estimates
of the income elasticities of exports.
As  noted previously, our point of departure is the Federal
Reserve’s own disaggregation of its “broad”effective exchange
rate index into two groups: major trading partners and other
important trading partners. In the former group stand the
countries in the euro area, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan; while the latter
group consists of Russia, Indonesia, and all Latin American
and Asian countries mentioned above. The exchange rate
components are depicted in Figure 5, taken from the Federal
Reserve (FRB 2003). We see here that until 1985 the two
exchange rate indexes behaved similarly, but after that there is
a marked difference between them. From 1985–95 the U.S.
real effective exchange rate depreciated far more with respect
to  its “major” trading partners, and subsequently it appre-
ciated far more relative to them.The differences are even more
striking in 2002, during which the U.S. real exchange rate fell
by 14.7 percent relative to its major trading partners, but rose
by 3 percent relative to the others. It is because of these oppo-
site trends that the “broad”real exchange rate declined by only
7 percent since its peak in the first quarter of 2002.
The differential behavior of exchange rate components sug-
gests that it might be useful to look at a similar decomposition
of trading-partner GDP.Figure 6 breaks down both our aggre-
gate measures into the same components as the exchange rate.
These are shown as logs of the values of the respective GDPs.
This allows us to see that the “other”trading partners measures
generally rise faster than the “major”trading partner measures.
Figure 7 displays the same measures relative to U.S. real GDP.
Broadly speaking, the major trading partners grew as fast as
Policy Note  2003 / 6
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Sources: World Bank and authors’ calculations
Source: Federal Reserve Boardthe United States up until 1992, but then lost ground there-
after. On the other hand, the other important trading part-
ners grew more rapidly than the United States throughout.
Other things being equal,this would imply that major trading-
partner growth had a neutral impact on the progress of the
U.S. balance of trade until 1992, and a negative one there-
after.
14
Conversely, the consistently more rapid growth of the
other trading partners should have had a positive impact on
the U.S. balance of trade all along, other things being equal.
So from 1992 to the present, the growth effect should have
worsened the U.S. balance of trade with its major-currency
partners, but should have improved its balance of trade with
its other important trading partners. The overall effect of
growth is therefore unclear.At the same time,we have already
seen that, except for 2002, the U.S. real exchange rates with
respect to the two groups behaved similarly,first depreciating
in the early 1990s and then appreciating sharply thereafter.
Thus the real exchange rate effect should have improved the
U.S. balance of trade until the mid 1990s and worsened it
thereafter.
We see therefore that splitting the trading partners into two
groups indicates that the growth effect acts in opposite direc-
tions across groups, while the real exchange rate effect acts in
opposite directions across time. It is therefore not obvious, a
fortiori,whether either effect can be taken as dominant in the
overall evolution of the U.S. balance of trade.
It is well known that growth is a central factor in the near
term fluctuations of the balance of trade. For instance, the
most recent Economic Report of the President (Council of
Economic Advisers 2003, 62) states that “one of the most
important [factors in the near-term development of the U.S.
current account] is the rate of economic growth in the rest of
the world.” Similarly, Mann (2002, 137–38) displays a corre-
lation of import growth with the growth in U.S. real GDP,
Is International Growth the Way Out of U.S.Current Account Deficits? A Note of Caution
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Figure 8  U.S.Trade Balance with Major-Currency
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and of export growth with the growth of trading-partner real
GDP.But it does not follow that one can carry this over to the
longer term evolution of the trade balance, for when we look
in Figure 8 at the U.S. trade balance with respect to the two
groups,
15
we find that both deteriorated in almost exactly the
same way.
A similar caution flag is raised when we consider the three
U.S. trading partners that account for the bulk of the U.S.
trade deficit since 1992. In order of their contribution to the
current account deficit, these are Japan, China, and Germany
(Figure 9).Since 1992,the United States has grown more rap-
idly than Japan and Germany, and considerably less rapidly
than China (Figure 10).Yet the U.S.trade deficit with all three
countries has significantly worsened over this same interval
(Figure 11).
Figures 8-11 indicate the importance of examining and ana-
lyzing the patterns of U.S.trade with subgroups of its various
trading partners. Our newly created database is intended to
carry us in that direction.At the very least,our present results
suggest that we should be cautious about implying that either
the restoration of growth in the rest of the world or some
realignment of exchange rates will be sufficient to reverse the
direction of the U.S. trade deficit. Other factors, particularly
the evolution of the underlying international competitiveness
of U.S. producers, also need to be addressed.
Summary and Conclusions
This note has been concerned with the presentation of newly
developed measures of the real GDP of U.S. trading partners.
Such measures are essential to the explanation of the U.S.bal-
ance of trade, the steady deterioration of which over the last
decade has prompted much investigation. Our new measures
are methodologically consistent with the widely used Federal
Reserve “broad”index of the exchange rate, which comprises
Figure 9  U.S.Balance of Trade and Overall Trade
Balance with the Three Main Contributors 
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all significant U.S. trading partners. We build our measures
around the same 36 countries, and utilize the same export
shares. The first of our measures is a direct sum of the real
GDPs of the U.S. trading partners, while the second is an
export-share-weighted total.Finally,since the Federal Reserve
disaggregates its “broad” effective U.S. exchange rate index
into two components representing “major” and “other
important”trading partners, we do the same for our two real
GDP measures and for their respective trade balances.
On the whole, we find that U.S. trading partners together
constitute an economic “region”between two and a half times
as large (direct sum) and three and a half times as large
(weighted average) as the United States. The real GDP of this
“region” grew more rapidly than that of the United States
from 1970–82 but less rapidly from 1992–2002.
This latter period of relatively slow growth in U.S. trading-
partner real GDP has been cited as an explanation for the
sharp deterioration of the U.S. trade balance since the early
1990s. But our data reveal a more complex pattern. We do
indeed find that as the United States grew more rapidly than
its “major-currency” trading partners over this interval, its
trade deficit with them did deteriorate as expected. However,
over this same interval the United States also grew more
slowly than its “other important” trading partners, and this
should have steadily improved the U.S. trade balance with
them, other things being equal. But in actuality this particu-
lar trade balance also deteriorated, to an almost identical
degree as that of the major currency partners.
A similar problem arises when we consider the three coun-
tries (Japan, China, and Germany) that account for the bulk
of the U.S. trade deficit since 1991. Since then, the United
States has grown more rapidly than Japan and Germany, and
considerably less rapidly than China. On the basis of the
growth effect alone, we would expect the U.S. trade deficit
9
Figure 10  Real GDPs of the Three Main Contributors 
to the U.S.Trade Deficit 














Figure 11  U.S.Balance of Trade with each of the 























China with Japan and Germany to have worsened, and that with China to have improved. Yet the
U.S. trade deficit has significantly worsened with all three, and most of all with China.
At the moment, ours is a cautionary tale. But one of the significant virtues of our new data-
base is that it enables us to delve into such matters in further detail. This is an ongoing proj-
ect, and we hope to make our findings available in forthcoming policy notes and working
papers on this subject.
Notes
1. Such measures are directly available in the World Bank’s “World Development Indicators.”One
can also construct similar measures from the data available in IMF’s “World Economic Outlook,”
although this requires more effort.
2. Chinn (2003, 33) cites “personal communication from Federal Reserve”as the source of his data.
He does not provide any further details as to its method of construction.
3. This measure was developed by Francis Cripps for use in the Cambridge World Economic Model. It
consists of quarterly estimates of export-share-weighted U.S. trading partner real GDP, in constant
1975 U.S. dollars. See Atkinson (1980).
4. See the Board of Governors’ “H.10 Statistical Release”(various dates) and Leahy (1998) for
details. As put by Leahy (1998, 811), this “group ...[ o fc ountries and currencies] ...is that of . . .
important U.S. trading partners.”
5. Although it is not part of our presentation here, our own database also includes Denmark, so as to
cover the European Community as a whole in subsequent analysis. In all such cases, the export
shares will be adjusted to reflect the actual countries covered.
6. The share of these countries in total U.S exports of goods has fluctuated between 87 percent and
90 percent, according to data from the United States International Trade Commission (available at
http://www.usitc.gov/).
7. Plus Denmark for subsequent analysis of the European Community.
8. Quarterly figures are only available with a lag of at least one quarter in any case. But for some
countries the lag was greater, particularly where quarterly figures have to be constructed from
annual data (hence lagging 4 quarters). In instances where the available data did not extend to the
last quarter of 2002, we interpolated annual forecasts from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
database to complete the series.
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109. The aggregate sum of 36 country GDPs may be thought of as an equal-weighted average, with
each weight equal to 1, so that the sum of weights is 36. Conversely, weighting each country’s
GDP by its share in U.S. exports gives us a weighted average with weights that sum to 1. For the
sake of consistency, we chose to scale this weighted average by multiplying it by 36, so that like
the direct sum, its rescaled value also has weights that sum to 36. This has no effect, of course, on
trends or growth rates.
10. On a log scale a straight line implies a constant rate of growth, an upward-curving line a rising
rate of growth, and a downward-curving line a falling rate of growth. Also, fluctuations of equal
magnitude represent equal percentage variations.
11. The aggregate direct sum depends on the sample chosen, which in our case covers roughly 90
percent of U.S. exports. Adding more countries, say by moving to the level of the rest of the
world (ROW), would add more to the aggregate GDP measure, but would only cover the other
10 percent of U.S. exports. In this sense, the export-share-weighted average is more meaningful,
since all other countries that could be added would be weighted by the remaining 10 percent of
export share.
12. Calculated as world GDP minus U.S. GDP, both in constant 1995 dollars, from World Bank (2002).
13. The blip in our direct sum measure in 1991 signals the addition of East Germany to the Federal
Reserve sample. Details are available in Working Paper no. 387.
14. The less rapid growth of the major-currency trading partners of the United States after 1992
would imply, other things being equal, that their imports from the United States (which are the
U.S. exports to them) would tend to grow less rapidly, which would represent a negative impact
on the balance of trade. Alternately, one could say that because the United States was growing
more rapidly than its major-currency trading partners, its imports from them would grow more
rapidly, and this would worsen the balance of trade, other things being equal.
15.We utilized the export and import shares for each country, as listed by the Federal Reserve, to derive
their corresponding nominal export and import levels and hence the nominal balance of trade.
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